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Introduction 
 
 
In today’s Russia, political life is dominated by two issues: Vladimir Putin staying in power, 
and national identity. These two subjects, popping up in every possible shape and form in 
official discourse and in the media, are pushing aside other issues, in particular the crucial 
question of social policy. As for the issue of human rights and freedoms, this is hardly ever 
mentioned. 
 
All current affairs issues are dealt with in relation to Putin, what he does, what he says, what 
he is planning, and more often than not, in relation to strengthening power and the ‘Russian 
national idea’. Advisors at the Kremlin and most of the candidates standing in the 
parliamentary elections on 2 December 2007 are hammering out three slogans: ‘Russia for the 
Russians’, ‘sovereign democracy’ and ‘Russian identity’. Their message is clear and can be 
summarised as follows: ‘Russia is back and is again becoming a country to be reckoned with 
in international politics. It no longer has to suffer interference and diktats from abroad. 
Russian leaders have the support of the people and know better than Western governments 
and experts what is best for their society. European "values" are subjective and Russians do 
not have to adopt them blindly.’ 
 
 
1. Vladimir Putin’s succession: a non-starter 
 
 
A lack of alternation in political power is a feature of authoritarian regimes. Russia is a 
typical example. Since Vladimir Putin was re-elected head of the Federation in March 2004, 
the 2008 headache has been on everyone’s mind. Under the terms of the 1993 Constitution, 
the Russian President can serve two consecutive four-year terms. The outgoing President 
knew he would have to leave his post in March 2008 unless the constitution was amended. 
Putin has chosen not to launch a revision of the Constitution, though this would not have 
posed any problems since Parliament was under the executive’s orders. The Duma elected in 
December 2003 numbers only a few true opposition members, and sometimes the Communist 
Party opposes government projects. As for the Parliament’s Upper Chamber, the Council of 
the Federation, it no longer has any authority since the reform of the way it is constituted. In 
1993 and 1995, the ‘senators’, as they were familiarly known at the time, were elected by 
direct universal suffrage. From 1999, the Council was made up of people sitting ex officio: the 
President of the Regional Assembly (elected) and the governor of the region or the President 
of the Republic (also elected). In 2003, the system was changed again. Each province (subject 
of the Federation, and there are 86 in 2007) still has two seats in the Council. The first seat is 
allocated by the provincial assembly, the second by the provincial administration. Neither has 
the direct legitimacy of the ballot box. 
 
However, even with very conciliatory members, the President did not want to revise Article 
81 of the Constitution. There are several interpretations. The most pertinent seems that Putin 
did not want to do what the dictators of Central Asia and Belarus were doing, granting 
themselves a third term and being able to stay in power as long as nobody else stopped them. 
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Putin is not keen on being compared to Islam Karimov, Nursultan Nazarbayev or Alexander 
Lukashenko. He is therefore taking care of his image by preserving, in appearance, the 
integrity of the text of the Constitution. The scenario he explained on 1 October 2007 to the 
Congress of the United Russia Party, which holds power, is nevertheless a crude subversion 
of the spirit of the Constitution text.  
 
If the idea is to transform Russian into a ‘parliamentary republic’ in which the Prime Minister 
would be the head of the executive and the President a national figure without decision-
making powers, this would require the adoption of a new Constitution. If the idea is to enable 
Vladimir Putin to buy some time by staying in power for a few months as Prime Minister and 
then taking over the Presidency again for two new consecutive terms, the operation is a 
veritable conjuring trick. The scenario would be as follows: Putin secures a massive win for 
the nomenklatura party United Russia on 2 December 2007. He makes full use of the 
‘administrative resource’ (a Russian euphemism for ‘control’ of the elections by the electoral 
commissions and local administrations), and makes sure his ‘party’ gets 65-70% of the vote, 
giving him approximately 75% of the seats in the Duma. The parliamentary elections would 
therefore be transformed into a vote of confidence for the Leader, and the Duma would no 
longer be a ‘representative’ body at all; its only function would be to rubber-stamp 
government bills. 
 
Three months later, on 2 March 2008, the presidential election will no longer be of any 
interest to the Russians, because Putin will be assured of remaining the true leader. The 
person chosen to occupy formally the post of President will be a very loyal man who has 
agreed in advance to resign from the Presidency when the time comes, for example because of 
ill health. In the meantime, Vladimir Putin will have obtained a ‘minor’ revision of the 
Constitution, setting the length of a presidential term at 7 years instead of 4. He has publicly 
stated on several occasions that he would prefer Russia to have a five-year or seven-year 
Presidency. He would then go to the polls in 2009 for a seven-year term. He can do this 
because the 1993 Constitution stipulates that the President may only serve for ‘two 
consecutive terms’. Once somebody else has been elected to the Presidency, the former head 
of state can once again aspire to the supreme office. On this basis, Vladimir Putin could be 
President until 2023! 
 
This scenario raises a number of political and technical problems, in particular the absolute 
loyalty of the temporary successor. The Constitution gives the President very extensive 
powers, and the ‘loyal friend’ could be tempted to distance his mentor. However, in the 
current Russian system, where the intelligence services and forces of law and order play a 
prominent role with the help of judges under orders, it is highly likely that the successor will 
be ‘constrained’ by these authorities and will not take the risk of going back on his word.  
 
The key thing here is to highlight the unconstitutional and anti-democratic nature of Vladimir 
Putin’s attempt to stay in power. On the one hand, universal suffrage is devalued. The 
elections are hijacked to Putin’s advantage. The Duma will be crushed by the dominant party, 
United Russia, and the other small party in power, A Just Russia, will simply be controlled by 
Putin’s people. The Communist Party will have a few deputies sitting in the Duma, who will 
sometimes vote for and sometimes against government plans. If Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s 
Liberal Democratic Party goes beyond the 7% threshold for entering the Duma, he will 
continue to fall in line with the executive. On the other hand, in the Russian system, the Prime 
Minister is not accountable to Parliament. He is appointed by the President and only the 
President can dismiss him. He must be accepted by the Duma, but as this will mainly consist 
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of apparatchiks without free choice, they will vote for the name put forward. If – and this is 
highly unlikely – a problem arises, the Duma will be dissolved by the President (Article 84 of 
the Constitution). 
 
So the generous interpretation made by some commentators of Putin’s intentions to slip from 
the Presidency into the government is not based on a very detailed analysis of the situation. 
The current Russian regime is strongly presidentialist and cannot change in one election into a 
parliamentary republic. To turn Russia into a British-style system, major institutional reform 
would be needed, even the adoption of a new constitution, and a reinstatement of the 
fundamental rights and freedoms without which voters are not citizens but subjects of a self-
elected and self-appointed ruling class. If the Parliament is made up only of apparatchiks who 
belong to a nomenklatura controlled by the executive power, how can this be described as 
‘parliamentarism’? 
 
The preparations for this scenario have been in the pipeline for some time, probably in 
parallel with other scenarios. Keeping several irons in the fire is a good tactic when you have 
four years, from early 2004 to late 2007, to seek the right outcome and test a number of 
avenues.  
 
The unexpected change of Prime Minister on 12 September 2007 can only be explained in the 
light of the declaration of 1 October. Everything then falls into place. Nothing could explain 
the urgency of introducing a ‘new government’, which has actually remained more or less the 
same since the cabinet reshuffle on 24 September. Why would a President preparing to leave 
his post six months later bother with this kind of manoeuvre? One of the explanations could 
lie with the personal finances of the regime’s leaders, and their need for protection. Viktor 
Zubkov, the new head of government, used to head up the government’s financial monitoring 
committee, officially a money laundering watchdog. He is therefore the person best informed 
on personal fortunes and the situation of private and public companies. One can imagine how 
much the question of immunity after leaving power matters to these men, who have all built 
personal fortunes and small financial empires under opaque and uncompetitive conditions. 
 
Those in positions of power in the Kremlin and the government administrations are directly in 
touch with the financial interests of the major energy and industrial companies. The 
presidential succession is not just a change of man and team at the head of the executive, but 
it affects a vast and complex system of personal and corporate interests, the operation and 
sustainability of which depend on Putin’s sphere of influence. Mikhail Khordokovsky, head 
of Yukos, was arrested in October 2003 on the eve of the last parliamentary elections as 
pressure from the Kremlin was mounting on all independent political and economic players. 
In 2006-2007, the pressure was cranked up even more. The assassination of high-profile 
journalist and government critic Anna Politkovskaya on 7 October 2006 was the most tragic 
demonstration of this. 
 
Putin wants to hold on to power at any price. Contrary to propaganda suggestions, he is not 
‘tired of power’ and is showing that any means of continuing to exercise considerable power 
is fine. As the Russian political scientist Maria Lipman, editor of the Russian magazine Pro et 
Contra (Carnegie Centre, Moscow), explains so well, ‘the power travels with Putin’, so he 
can switch temporarily from the Presidency to the government. Vladimir Putin can succeed 
with this ‘kidnapping’ of the government at the Presidency’s expense simply because he is the 
head of an all-powerful organisation and holds all the cards for making people do what he 
wants. He does not even have to worry about the institutions any more. The last independent 
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deputy of the outgoing Duma, Vladimir Ryzhkov, says that all the public institutions have 
been systematically weakened, or even emptied of all substance; they are not capable of 
constituting an obstacle to the consolidation of Putin’s system of power. Neither Parliament 
nor the Constitutional Court, nor the Central Electoral Commission exists independently of 
the will of the President. As has been well documented by the sociologist Olga 
Kryshtanovskaya1, power is in the hands of Putin, of those close to him and of the intelligence 
services; power will be concentrated wherever Putin is. The most obvious choice seemed to 
him the post of Prime Minister, which remains formally an executive role though subject to 
the authority of the President, with no accountability towards the deputies since the 
government is not answerable to Parliament.  
 
For this institutional sleight of hand to be accepted, the regime needed to make sure three 
essential conditions were in place: public institutions stripped of their authority; firm control 
of the media and the public information system; economic and social players prepared to 
accept the ‘contract’ of power, which consists of submitting to certain rules in order to be able 
to function in peace. One of these rules is to stay out of politics and never criticise decisions 
made on high. 
 
And we will see that a fourth factor fosters authoritarianism and is fostered by it: an ‘uncivil’ 
society, i.e. one that is indifferent to politics, individualistic, and prepared to tolerate the 
erosion of fundamental rights and freedoms. 
 
 
2. The deconstruction of the public institutions 
 
 
Since 2000, the objective of Putin’s team has been to restrict pluralism, competition and 
criticism in both politics and economic affairs. Yukos, Chechnya and the elections are three 
inseparable elements of a single phenomenon: the concentration of power within a small 
ruling class through the desertification of the public arena and control of the country’s 
resources. The results bear witness to the effectiveness of despotic methods and the fear they 
spread within society. There are few intellectuals, independent deputies or human rights 
activists who dare to challenge the regime loudly and clearly. 
 
Putin says he is the guarantor of a strong government, but in reality he is weakening and 
discrediting the public institutions2. The structure he is relying on is the presidential 
administration, an extended cabinet that doubles up on the government and works closely 
with the intelligence services and business networks. How did the policy to restore the State, 
announced in 2000, lead to such damage to institutional processes? 
 
To understand the mindset and methods that have dominated since the start of Putin’s 
Presidency, it is important to look back at the Yeltsin decade and the conditions that led to a 
lieutenant-colonel turned head of the FSB being propelled into the position of head of State. 
 
The political history of the 1990s is the history of a State neglected by its own elite. After the 
collapse of the USSR in 1991, the defeat of the State, inseparable from the defeat of the 
                                                 
1 Olga Kryshtanovskaya, ‘Putin’s Militocracy’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 19, 4, 2003, pp. 289-306, ‘Opasnye liudi v 
shtatskom’ (Dangerous men in civilian clothes), Ezhenedel’nyi zhurnal, 15, March 2004. 
2 La Russie de Poutine, edited by Marie Mendras, Pouvoirs journal, No 113, 2005. 
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Communist regime, led to a rejection of the very concept of State and the rules of public 
government. The Soviet system was perceived as having done for itself through an 
overinflated State party and an ineffective hierarchy incapable of producing growth and 
wealth. The State was neither liked nor respected; the bureaucracies were considered 
predatory and inefficient. Since Gorbachev’s perestroika, all discourse on reform had been 
calling for the reduction of the role of the State. Hyperliberalism more than the spirit of 
democracy was blowing through political and economic circles.  
 
In the early 1990s, everyone’s energies went into the economy: freedom of pricing and trade, 
new legislation on property, companies and finance. Privatisations enabled some of the old 
nomenklatura and young entrepreneurs to get rich; some built up colossal fortunes. Apart 
from a few legal experts and some intellectuals, nobody was thinking about the State. The 
Kremlin simply kept a roadmap for democratic institutions and the legislation necessary for 
the capitalist transformation, particularly the privatisations. Even the drafting of the new 
constitution in the end escaped public debate. After the acute crisis that brought Yeltsin into 
conflict with a large group of deputies in October 1993, ending with an armed attack that left 
around 200 dead, the draft constitution was revised on the quiet and was not subject to any 
more criticism until the December 1993 referendum. 
 
Liberalisation and the tremendous opportunities opening up in the economic and financial 
domain were such that institutional policy and discussion of the future of society were not 
priorities. Economic interests and the habits of secrecy and lack of accountability to the public 
certainly allowed the anti-democratic and predatory behaviour by some of the elite. Yeltsin, 
his advisors and ministers did not safeguard the construction of a democratic State, or 
effective, accountable government, but they did not oppose the liberalisation of the country 
either. 
 
During Boris Yeltsin’s first term of office, Russia experienced remarkable openness and 
genuine democratisation of public life, particularly the pluralism of the media and competitive 
elections. However, at the same time, in a manner that was still quite sporadic, damage was 
slowly being done to the democratic institutions, and this trend accelerated during Yeltsin’s 
second term, from the summer of 1996 to the end of 1999. Re-elected through the financial 
support of the oligarchs and the zeal of certain bureaucrats, though sick and rarely seen in the 
Kremlin, Boris Yeltsin allowed a ‘courtly regime’ to become established; corruption and 
scandal went right to the top of the State. The financial crash of August 1998 exploded the 
Muscovite bubble and revealed the government’s deficiencies.  
 
It was against this shabby background at the end of Yeltsin’s reign that Vladimir Putin was 
chosen as successor. He had to deliver on certain commitments, in particular guaranteeing 
‘The Family’ (those close to Boris Yeltsin) immunity. The Bank of New York scandal 
directly touched the President’s family. So in 1999-2000 Putin was not chosen as successor 
for his personality or for his leadership qualities. 
 
Despite Yeltsin having made him his successor, Putin went on constantly to criticise the 
disorder and negligence inherited from his predecessor. All the rhetoric of ‘order’ since 2000 
has been built on devaluing the previous government. The moment the slightest criticism is 
made of the drift towards authoritarianism, defenders of the regime reply: it’s better than the 
chaos of before. 
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It is very easy now to oversimplify the situation and present Yeltsin’s government as a 
hostage to unscrupulous oligarchs, corrupt bureaucrats and provincial leaders serving their 
own interests, scornful of public spiritedness. Since 2000 Putin’s team has attacked the 
autonomy of the provinces and moved towards strengthening the Federation. The war in 
Chechnya and the terrorist attacks have provided the regime with justification for its 
authoritarian, centralising strategy: because the nation is in danger, the unity and integrity of 
the State must be strengthened. In an interview he gave in September 2004 after the dramatic 
Beslan school hostage crisis, Vladislav Surkov, deputy chief of staff of the presidential 
administration, was not afraid to say that in the face of the threat of annihilation of the 
integrity of the state, the President was obliged to use the constitutional principle of unity of 
the executive. The fight against terrorism required that federalism be pushed aside and 
executive powers concentrated in the Kremlin. 
 
Vladimir Putin has become the Leader over all, including the institutions. Paradoxically, a 
chief over whom there is no institutional control finds himself at the mercy of backstage 
battles and struggles between private and corporate interests, in a world focused on securing 
votes. The battles taking place in the autumn of 2007 are even affecting the various 
intelligence services and security organisations. In early October, officials from the Federal 
Anti-Drug Service were arrested by the FSB, the successor of the KGB. The director of the 
Service condemned the ‘dog-eat-dog warfare’ between the different factions of the 
intelligence world. This provides another example of why the excessive concentration of 
power is no guarantee of stability. 
 
 
3. The media and obstacles to freedom of information and expression 
 
The Russian media, mainly the television companies and most of the major newspapers, are 
subject to increasingly tight control. President Putin and his team are starting to find it 
intolerable to hear or read critical opinions. The hunting out of any form of public opposition 
is intensifying as the parliamentary elections of 2 December 2007 draw closer. The president 
of the Russian Union of Journalists, Vsevolod Bogdanov, underlines the fact that the media 
are no longer made up of journalists, but of apparatchiks and ‘polittekhnologui’ or ‘political 
advisors’ working directly for the administration. ‘In the media, fewer than 12% of 
programmes and publications could be considered to be “journalism”; the rest is propaganda 
and “public relations” (PR in Russian), attacks and denunciations (kompromat) and 
advertising’, and of course, entertainment3. In a detailed study, Oleg Panfilov draws up a 
distressing assessment of the press and television in Russia. As expert Floriana Fossato 
explains, the total ‘bringing to heel’ of the two government television channels, ORT and 
RTR, gives Putin’s regime control of the political and social information broadcast to 80% of 
Russians. The vast majority of Russians are actually hostages to official television because 
they do not have access either to the Internet or to satellite channels or to the critical 
Muscovite press4. 
 
The process began in 1999-2000 with the new war in Chechnya. It was necessary to present 
the Chechens as terrorists and hide the extreme violence and brutality being used by the 
                                                 
3 ‘In society, nobody trusts words any more’, interview with Vsevolod Bogdanov, 
Novayagazeta.ru/data/2007/32/24.html 
4 Floriana Fossato, ‘Vladimir Putin and the Russian Television “Family”’, Les Cahiers Russie – The Russia 
Papers, CERI-Sciences Po, No 1, 2006. 
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Russian forces. In August 2000 the Kursk submarine disaster, which was very badly handled 
by political and military leaders, was criticised by the media, which revealed all the system’s 
flaws – especially the refusal to accept foreign help and the indifference towards the victims. 
From that moment, Putin decided to be the holder of all information on major crises and 
impose secrecy and disinformation on sensitive subjects. He attacked a number of oligarchs, 
particularly Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky, forced them into exile and took over 
their media. In 2001 the last independent television channel, NTV, was forced to give way to 
the pressure and kompromat (compromising dossiers opportunely put together against the 
editors and journalists).  
 
The persecution of the independent media accelerated in 2003-2004 with the Yukos affair and 
the incarceration of Mikhail Khordokovsky, and the Beslan school tragedy in September 
2004. For example, the daily newspaper Izvestiya rather disrespectfully published photos of 
the hostage-taking. The editor-in-chief was immediately dismissed and the newspaper content 
became devoid of any interest. 
 
Between 2000 and 2007 twenty-two journalists were assassinated. Anna Politkovskaya was 
killed in her apartment building on 7 October 2006. The investigation will never be 
completed, except perhaps to stage a show trial of one or two people who were acting under 
orders. Those who ordered the attack have nothing to fear in an authoritarian system where 
the judiciary is working for the executive on political matters. Having been present at the trial 
of Mikhail Khordokovsky and studied the legal case, I can state with assurance that it was a 
terrible farce. And the forthcoming trial to extend the sentence of the former Yukos boss will 
be exactly the same. 
 
Manana Aslamazian, director of Internews Russia, cannot return to her country, where she 
was falsely accused of money laundering and risks several years in prison. Internews, an 
organisation that does remarkable work training regional journalists, has been closed. 
 
4. An uncivil society 
 
The parliamentary elections of December 2007 and the presidential elections planned for 
March 2008 are creating concern and pressure, despite the fact that the Kremlin and its 
bureaucrats have a firm grip on the ‘election machine’ and objectively have no reason to 
worry about not securing the election results they want. How can we explain this paradox of 
authoritarianism entertaining uncertainty?  
 
Opinion polls show that Russians generally are concerned and are not subscribing 
wholeheartedly to the official line of complete stability and cohesion in Russian society. They 
can feel the tensions at the top, and the ripples they are sending down through regional and 
local political life.  
 
Several provincial governors and mayors of large towns were deposed or even charged with 
crimes in 2006-2007. When a mayor or governor is causing trouble, it is easy to go after them 
for some offence. The mayor of Togliatti (a large industrial town in the Samara region), the 
mayor of Archangelsk and the mayor of Khanty-Mansiysk have been prosecuted in the last 
few months. 
 
Furthermore, the government’s economic policy is increasingly difficult to decipher and there 
are no robust policies to tackle the basic problems – declining population, deficiencies in the 
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healthcare and education systems, insecurity – in the medium and long term. Life expectancy 
for men remains at 58 years, approximately 20 years lower than in Western Europe, and 
infant mortality remains abnormally high. AIDS is spreading without any preventive 
measures in place. A cancer sufferer in Russia has a much lower chance of survival than a 
cancer sufferer in Europe. According to official statistics, crime levels are on the increase. 
NGOs condemn the rise in the level of violence tolerated by those in power, particularly racist 
crimes and xenophobic actions.  
 
Partiality among judges is the main reason why people get away with certain crimes, and 
therefore why the crimes are committed. It is quite clear that an independent justice system 
and severe punishment for the perpetrators of racist crimes or the hired assassins of Anna 
Politkovskaya would slow down the rise in levels of violence. Without sentencing, and often 
even without trials, the era of non-accountability looks set to continue for some time. The 
political, administrative, military and police leaders are not accountable to anyone except their 
chief. Vladimir Putin did not shoulder the State’s responsibility in the tragic dénouement of 
the hostage crisis at the Beslan school in September 2004. No leaders in Moscow were 
punished; only a few ‘locals’ in Ossetia faced penalties5.  
 
Lack of accountability among those governing breeds lack of responsibility among those 
being governed. Society gets used to these abuses and tolerates the authoritarianism of the 
regime. As long as the State demands no individual or collective effort of them, Russians are 
prepared to make do with the system in place, even though they remain critical of its basis and 
have little optimism for the future. It needs to be understood that it is nationalistic and 
xenophobic ideology, artificially constructed on the ‘image of the enemy’, that fosters this 
attitude of hostility or simply indifference to politics among Russians. Putin’s regime has also 
amassed the benefits of the ‘oil effect’ since 2000. The big increase in the price of 
hydrocarbons has filled the State’s coffers and revived economic growth. Around 70% of 
Russians have a better standard of living and are encouraged to support the person who has 
presided over this improvement. This higher standard of living is being correlated with 
authoritarianism in Russia at the expense of the democratisation paradigm, where economic 
improvement encourages the rule of law. 
 
The attached surveys show that fundamental rights and freedoms are not a priority for the 
majority of Russians, who consider ‘economic rights’ more important. On the other hand, 
they are mistrustful of the authorities and defend their new-found individualism. 
 
Russian citizens have not protested about any subject to do with the defence of democracy. 
Apart from among those working to defend human rights in the largest cities, there has been 
no reaction to the law on non-governmental organisations, which came into force in early 
2006, imposes many obstacles and constraints on the operation of these organisations, and has 
led to the closure of the most sensitive NGOs. And yet some of the NGOs closed or harassed 
for political reasons are also engaged in very useful work in the social sector (health, 
education). Nor has there been any popular protest against the text of an extremely worrying 
anti-extremism law. Passed in 2007, this law is not designed to prevent and punish crimes of 
racism and violence in the Caucasus. It is designed to give the authorities leeway in their 
                                                 
5 The Beslan Mothers' Committee has been humiliated and ill-treated by the authorities on several occasions. Even Vladimir 
Putin, when he finally agreed to meet them one year after the crisis, was extremely disagreeable about it (he suggested 
receiving them on the anniversary, which was intolerable for most of the mothers who wanted to be at the graves of their 
children in Beslan, not at the Kremlin) and he expressed neither apology nor genuine regret. The Committee did not even 
manage to secure a fair trial of the local leaders (The Moscow Times, 4 May 2007). 
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unequal combat against political opponents, independent journalists and the enemies of the 
regime. Among the many examples, we could mention the court appearance of the great 
political commentator Andrei Piontkovsky in late September 2007, for several sentences in 
his latest book. Piontkovsky has condemned the war in Chechnya and the violence of Putin’s 
regime right from the beginning. 
 
The new legislative and regulatory measures, and particularly the spirit in which these texts 
are applied, have very serious effects. The effect is particularly bad on vulnerable sections of 
the population: emigrants, migrants, people of the Caucasus, people living in extreme poverty, 
the sick and the disabled. They have no protection, and no power against arbitrarily applied 
provisions. They become people without rights. 
 
So fundamental rights are in peril, particularly for the most vulnerable members of the 
population. The right to equal access to healthcare and education and the right not to be 
discriminated against are not being respected6. Nor is the right to own property guaranteed 
against the despotic will of an administration or the whim of a leader (in the case of Yukos). 
And the Russians, encouraged by those in power to adopt the mentality of a fortress under 
siege by imaginary enemies, do not react against and often even approve of the drift away 
from democracy. 
 
So should the leaders in Moscow alone have decision-making rights and the power to dictate 
general State policies? The ordinary Russian convinces himself that he has made a good 
‘choice’ by electing Putin, though there was no competition, and is relieved that Putin is 
staying in power. He is a hostage to a single line of thought, and a single ruling elite that has 
pushed aside any serious alternative. He has become a Putinist. And in some ways has 
reverted to being a Soviet: ‘Anyway, whatever you put in the ballot box, “they” will win. So 
why get worked up about it? Why believe you can turn back the tide of history? Why fight, 
and what are the other options anyway?’. Enforced loyalty and therefore a form of single ideal 
mark the end of the rights of minorities, and any opposition. The Kremlin’s principal 
instrument of domination is the elimination of any viable, credible alternative to the existing 
power structure. Anna Politkovskaya wrote with bitterness in her last book: ‘The whole 
system can only exist if the people keep quiet. The silence of the population is the principal 
phenomenon of Russian political life today’7. She attributed this attitude to the vague sense of 
fear everyone has that makes them not want to step out of line. 
                                                 
6 ‘Les migrants en Russie. Des populations fragilisées, premières victimes des crises politiques internes et 
externes’, FIDH Report, with the collaboration of Grajdanskoe sodeistvie, No 472, April 2007. 
7 Anna Politkovskaya, A Russian Diary. A Journalist's Final Account of Life, Corruption and Death in Putin's 
Russia, Random House, 2007, p. 137. 
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5. Controlled elections: the administrative machine and the end of the opposition  
 
 
The electoral system is a crucial tool in the hands of the Kremlin, more so than the 
constitutional provisions on executive power and legislative power. On it depends both the 
public’s relationship with voting (trust, respect for the ballot box and its effects) and the 
openness of the institutions, whether genuine or not, to all political forces. In Russia, revisions 
to disallow access for some political forces to the Duma, and therefore to other organs of 
power, have also been added to the equation. 
 
Since Vladimir Putin’s statement on 1 October 2007, the only elections that count are the 
parliamentary elections of 2 December. Who will be interested in the presidential election 
three months later if Putin is still holding the reins? And as Putin has asked for an 
unequivocal victory, the administrative and intelligence machine will be working flat out until 
the night of 2 December. The OSCE will not be sending an observation mission to Russia 
until November, later than usual, because the Russian authorities have slowed the process 
down. The latest changes made since 2000 aim to strengthen the ‘party of power’, to block the 
smaller parties and to prevent politicians of calibre from breaking through. The Duma was 
elected in 1993, 1995, 1999 and 2003 in two separate halves with 225 deputies being elected 
from single-member constituencies and 225 on a party list system. The threshold for a single 
party to enter Parliament was 5% of the vote. The 2005 law changed all this. The 450 
members of the Duma will be elected from lists, and the threshold has been increased to 7%. 
Based on the results of the parliamentary elections of December 2003, the calculation behind 
this change is perfectly clear. In 2003, several parties won between 3% and 6% of the vote. 
 
In the third legislature of 2003-2007, several seats are held by opposition members elected 
from single-member constituencies. Either they do not belong to a party, or they belong to a 
party that was not eligible to form a group in the Duma, or they are members of the 
Communist Party, which has a group in the Lower Chamber and remains a formal opposition 
party. These members will disappear from the fourth legislature elected in December 2007. 
Vladimir Ryzhkov is the intended victim of the revision of the electoral code. Popular at 
home in the Altai region, and a constituency member of the Duma continuously since 1993, 
he was the co-chairman of the Republican Party. This Party was shut down by an arbitrary 
administrative decision in the spring of 2007. The opposition parties have almost all been 
dissolved by force or banned from the elections: the National Bolshevik Party, the Republican 
Party, the Rodina Party, among others. Only three or four parties will reach the 7% threshold 
on 2 December: the United Russia Party led by Putin, the Spravedlivaia Rossia (A Just 
Russia) Party, the Communist Party, and perhaps Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s LDPR Party. Apart 
from the Communist Party, these parties are directly controlled by the Kremlin. 
 
The election of provincial governors has been abolished. To make the regional leaders into 
henchmen or prefects of the central power rather than representatives accountable to their 
constituents, Vladimir Putin withdrew their popular legitimacy. In an unscrupulous misuse of 
the Beslan school tragedy in September 2004, by decree he ended the election of the 
governors of the regions and the presidents of the republics (elections that were introduced in 
1993-1995). The main reason invoked by Vladimir Putin to end the use of the ballot box was 
‘security’. Regional chiefs approved by the Kremlin would be better able to perform their role 
of keeping order. In addition, he added, the elections provided too much opportunity for 
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horse-trading and corruption. Appointed governors and presidents would be less corrupt! 
Experience from 2004-2007 has shown the opposite: a constant increase in corruption within 
the administrations and large companies with links to them8. Criminal cases against 
administrative leaders are becoming more common; it is very difficult to say which are based 
on crimes for which there is evidence. 
 
In a country where unanimity has for a long time been the rule and which has no real 
experience of popular representation, freely allowing respect for ‘the tyranny of the majority’ 
under conditions of freedom would require a radically different policy from the one being 
pursued by the Kremlin. With Putin, Russia has departed de facto from majority rule and is 
approaching unanimism9. Only ‘loyalty’ to the chief guarantees the exercise of authority. 
 
Post-Soviet Russia has never understood the concept of opposition. As Maurice Duverger 
comments in his analysis of majority systems, for representative democracy to work properly, 
it has to be based essentially on the dynamic between parties in power and in opposition. If 
the status of the opposition is not recognised, and if the parties independent of the ruling team 
are treated as hostile elements, as anti-patriotic, as disruptive elements stopping the 
government from working, particularly by blocking bills, then you have majority democracy 
only in name. The regime has become a dominant power system, in which power is 
concentrated in the hands of a few, their families and companies. Conversely the British 
system, probably one of the purest models of majority democracy, grants the opposition a 
clearly defined and well protected status and functions. 
 
 
6. Violence and repression 
 
 
Violence is on the increase in Russia, and not just in the North Caucasus. Are Russians 
prepared to get used to a high level of violence at the core of society? As Anna Politkovskaya 
described very clearly in her books10, the war in Chechnya and all the abuses committed there 
on a daily basis have sowed the seeds elsewhere in Russia of suspicion, insecurity and 
violence between people.  
 
The armed violence in Chechnya has gradually spread into all the neighbouring republics of 
the North Caucasus. There is huge insecurity there for ordinary civilians. Torture is 
commonplace11. In 2007, Ingushetia was particularly badly hit by the brutality of the militia 
and the forces of law and order. Marie Jego’s September reporting shows how similar the 
methods are to those used in Chechnya12. The American expert Sarah Mendelson highlights 
the direct link between the permissibility of violence and the loss of interest in human rights. 
Security and human rights go hand-in-hand. Only respect for the rights of individuals can 
                                                 
8 Concerning corruption, see the assessment reports by INDEM, directed by Georgy Satarov, and by 
Transparency International. 
9 See Mikhail Sokolov, ‘Le vote confisqué en Russie. Etude des élections régionales de 2007’, Les Cahiers 
Russie – The Russia Papers, No 5, 2007; Jean-Charles Lallemand, ‘Russie. Les élections législatives 
transformées en plébiscite’, Esprit, November 2007, forthcoming. 
10 See particularly her book A Small Corner of Hell: Dispatches from Chechnya, University of Chicago Press, 
2003. 
11 ‘La torture en Tchétchénie: la normalisation du cauchemar’, FIDH Report, No 462, November 2006. See also 
Amnesty International reports, in particular ‘Russian Federation: What justice for Chechnya's disappeared?’, 
May 2007. 
12 Le Monde, 4 October 2007. 
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push back the tide of violence and insecurity13. The macroeconomic growth is not benefiting 
the peoples of the North Caucasus, where unemployment is high and poverty endemic. 
 
Violence within the Russian army is a permanent problem. According to the Union of 
Soldiers’ Mothers Committees, hundreds of conscripts die outside combat situations every 
year from ill-treatment, initiation ceremony and suicide.  
 
The repression of political opposition and any criticism of those in power is leading to 
demonstrations of force by the special forces, the OMON, in Russia’s big cities. All unofficial 
demonstrations are now carefully managed by men in uniform, always in greater numbers 
than the citizens trying to express an opinion. Some are brutally repressed or banned. The 
most dramatic episodes were the repression of peaceful demonstrations on 14 April 2007 in 
Moscow and several other big cities. Not only were opponents from ‘The Other Russia’ 
movement, including Garry Kasparov, and many other demonstrators including foreigners, 
arrested and manhandled, but processions of the Nachi, the pro-Putin youth, were organised at 
the same time. The Nachi could noisily fill the main roads under the jeering eyes of police 
officers while the OMON brutally dealt with the anti-Putin protesters. 
 
On 5 and 6 October, in Nizhny-Novgorod, a conference and commemoration in homage to 
Anna Politkovskaya were banned and many people were arrested. Four guests from the West 
spent several hours at the police station. They were reprimanded for taking part in a 
demonstration when their tourist visas only allowed them to ‘do some shopping and visit 
monuments’14. 
 
The official excuse for repression is always the nationalistic discourse and the threat against 
the country: the Russian national idea, ‘sovereign democracy’, the fight against enemies who 
want to ‘destabilise’ Russia. The building of a Russian identity ‘for the Russians’ based on 
xenophobia reached a new level in the autumn of 2006 when the authorities engaged in open 
conflict against Georgians in Russia and against Georgia itself. The image of the enemy 
propagated by the official media is becoming more diverse, from the Chechen to the Georgian 
and Azerbaijani, and from the warmongering American to the anti-Russian European (for 
criticising Russia’s so-called authoritarianism and human rights violations). The hostility 
previously reserved for the Caucasians and Chernye (coloured immigrants) now affects all ex-
Soviet nationalities, even the Ukrainians. The Russians feel ‘isolated’, but they have isolated 
themselves. 
                                                 
13 Sarah Mendelson, ‘49 Steps to Improve Human Rights and Security in the North Caucasus’, CSIS Report, 
Washington, September 2007 (www.csis.org). 
14 Reported in Novaya Gazeta, Radio Svoboda, Kommersant, on the websites grani.ru, lenta.ru, and in the 
English-language daily, The Moscow Times. 
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Conclusion 
 
Two major trends will continue in the coming years. Firstly, as long as the income based on 
raw materials is maintained, Putin’s regime will continue to follow the same authoritarian 
path, but with increasingly marked imbalances and less and less ability to arbitrate between 
the influential groups. Neither the elite nor society will oppose the current rules of the game. 
The spectre of an orange revolution does not currently haunt Russia. Destabilisation is more 
likely to come from difficult conflicts between the few clans holding the reins of political and 
economic power. There is no certainty that Vladimir Putin and his men will manage to 
arbitrate. Another threat is posed by the North Caucasus, where a major crisis could erupt. 
 
Secondly, Russia’s foreign policy is very directly affected by internal changes within the 
country. The tougher stance taken within the country accompanies a hardening of discourse 
and action in international politics. Moscow will be increasingly disagreeable towards the 
European countries and institutions. So it is important to consolidate all channels of 
communication with Russian society, economic players, charities and alternative elites rather 
than waiting for an improbable thaw at the top. 
 
The European Parliament is particularly well placed to intensify exchanges with Russian 
citizens and with Russian organisations defending their country’s interests by working to 
establish the rule of law. All these people are working for is to secure the democratisation and 
welfare of the population. They are working under increasingly difficult conditions and taking 
risks. As Russian lawyer Karinna Moskalenko, Head of the International Protection Center, 
says, if the Europeans fail to provide constant support for defenders of human rights in 
Russia, they will be even more vulnerable. Lawyers, journalists, political activists and 
independent intellectuals will become the victims of the regime they are fighting. 
 
In addition to supporting NGOs, the European Parliament can play the important role of 
providing information. The Putin regime exploits the ignorance and lack of interest of 
European governments towards certain aspects of Russian domestic policy in order to 
monopolize the sphere of information and disinformation. It is therefore vital to keep up a 
sustained effort at seeking out and disseminating reliable information. The EU’s governments 
and executive institutions will not then be able to say ‘we didn’t know’ or ‘we didn’t realise 
how serious the political situation in Russia was’. They will not be able to allow the 
immediate economic, energy and security interests of Member States to prevail, treating as 
secondary the drift towards authoritarianism of a Russian system increasingly hostile to an 
open partnership with Europe. 
 
There seem to me to be two priority areas for cooperation with Russian society and 
institutions: justice, the cornerstone of the rule of law; and education and training, the 
foundation of future generations. In both these areas, the EU can play a perfectly legitimate 
role and action is possible. These are not areas that have been closed off by the Kremlin, like 
the military, the defence industry and the energy and financial conglomerates. Russian leaders 
at intermediate level welcome cooperation projects. However, the government is being 
increasingly obstructive of joint programmes, claiming that education financed from abroad 
can hide a form of subversion. 
 
Lawyers and defenders of human rights are stressing the crucial role of the European Court, 
the only institution the Russian authorities fear at all.  
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Finally, finding the right pitch with Russian players is essential. Russian leaders use an 
emotional style. Their discourse is passionate, at times romantic and appealing and at times 
violent and aggressive. Whatever the case, the tone they use is not dispassionate or open to 
discussion. Europeans have nothing to gain from entering the emotional arena. On the 
contrary, it is important to stay calm and reasonable, always to rely on verified information, 
objective facts and concrete proposals. It would be inappropriate to respond to a tough 
Russian stance in an excessively friendly manner. The Russian side would take away a sense 
of the European’s weakness, not their desire to make progress with the dialogue. It is 
important not to let any incorrect information or dishonest interpretation through without 
pointing out that we disagree with it. 
 
All Europeans have the capability of being well informed about Russia and have the right to 
demonstrate this to any Russians they are speaking to. Being well informed about Russian 
public life is not an act of hostility towards the Russians but a sign of interest and respect, and 
a commitment to maintain a solid relationship. 
 
For Russian citizens fighting to stop the authoritarian lid closing on society, there is no more 
bitter disappointment or sense of failure than to hear a European unthinkingly approving 
Putin’s policies, or to see silence and indifference in the face of flagrant breaches of 
fundamental rights and freedoms. 
 
In contrast to the Soviet era, the borders are open, which means that dialogue and cooperation 
with non-government and government agencies is possible in many areas. The European 
Parliament has the means to support ideas and actions favourable to the Russians without 
necessarily gaining the Kremlin’s approval.
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ANNEX  
 
OPINION POLLS 
 
SURVEY BY THE LEVADA CENTRE, January 2007 
 
1. RUSSIA AND DEMOCRACY 
 
− Russian understanding of democracy, liberalism, freedom and human rights is confused 
and often contradictory, and Russians appear to see little application of these values to 
their own lives.  Some 65% of the sample were unable to describe what liberal democracy 
means to them. However, when asked to choose a definition for democracy from a series 
of options, 54% of those giving a positive response cite either a ‘fair system of state 
governance based on the participation of all citizens on equal terms’, or a ‘series of 
guarantees to observe citizens’ rights and freedoms by the authorities/government’. Only 
9% cite such fundamental democratic principles as the ‘free competition of political 
parties for voters’ and ‘separation of powers (the executive, judiciary and legislature) and 
accountability of the authorities to its citizens’.  
 
− Of those giving a negative response, most (19%) say democracy is just ‘empty talk and 
demagoguery’, 12% say it is a ‘system of government for normal countries, but not 
Russia’, and 11% say it means ‘chaos, disorder and anarchy’.  
 
− 12% said democracy is suitable for other nations, but not for Russia. Only 37% of 
Russians feel it exists in their country at all. 
 
What do you identify the word ‘democracy’ with most?  
(Respondents could name several alternatives, the replies were graded) 
 
Positive results (%) Negative results  (%) 
A fair system of state governance based 
on the participation of all citizens on 
equal terms 
27 Empty talk, demagoguery   19 
A series of guarantees to observe the 
rights and freedoms of citizens given 
by the authorities/Government 
27 A system of government for 
‘normal countries’ but not 
for us  
12 
A way of criticising the authorities/ 
Government at all levels  
13 Chaos, disorder, anarchy  11 
The separation of executive, legislative 
and judiciary powers and the 
accountability of the government to its 
citizens  
 
9 A system of governance 
that has proved its 
inefficiency in Russia  
(1990-1999) 
10 
Free competition between political 
parties elected  by voters  
9 Absence of a firm hand in 
the country’s governance, 
diffusion of responsibility 
8 
Total  85 Total  60 
No opinion 10   
 
 
19 
- As a political system, Western democracy does not appeal to most Russians. Over 40% of 
respondents consider it to be inappropriate, even destructive, for Russia.  
 
Do you believe that Western democracy and Western culture… 
 
 2000 April 
2006 
December 
Are necessary, will have a recovery effect for Russia  2 3 
Can be benefited from a lot  55 45 
Are not suitable for us  25 30 
Are destructive, pernicious for Russia  10 12 
No opinion  8 10 
 
− However this view appears to be contradicted as nearly half of the sample believe that 
Russia needs a democracy, with 19% saying that it doesn’t. 
 
− When asked about Western democracy and culture, 30% say ‘it does not suit us’, while 
45% say ‘we can learn a lot of useful things from it’. This differentiation springs from the 
apparent view that there is a Russian democracy and a Western democracy.  Russian 
democracy is seen as paternalistic and thus the popularity of the Soviet system. 
 
− When asked for their preference for Russian state governance, 35% prefer the Soviet 
system, 26% the current system, and 16% Western-style democracy. 
−  
Which political system do you think is the most appropriate for Russia? 
 
 1996
i (%) 
19972 
(%) 
19982 
(%) 
20002 
(%) 
20032 
(%) 
20042 
(%) 
20052 
(%) 
2006 
(%) 
The Soviet 
system we had 
before the 
1990s 
 
34 
 
38 
 
43 
 
42 
 
48 
 
41 
 
42 
 
35 
Current system 18 11 5 11 18 19 23 26 
Democracy 
based on the 
Western model  
 
25 
 
28 
 
32 
 
26 
 
22 
 
24 
 
20 
 
16 
Other  8 8 7 4 6 5 6 7 
No opinion  15 15 13 17 6 11 9 16 
 
− When asked if Russia has ever been a democratic state, and if so, when, 27% believe that 
Russia has never been a democracy. A third say Russia is currently a democracy, while 
12% felt Russia had been a democracy during Brezhnev’s time.  
  
− Russians appear to be overwhelmingly apathetic about the degree of influence they can 
apply on the country, their city or region, their district or street. A minimum of three 
quarters said they had little or no influence over anything other than their family. The 
largest number (over 90% in each case) feel that they have little or no influence over what 
happens in Russia as a whole, or in their region or city.   
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What influence can you have on what occurs in...? 
 
 Decisive/Considerable 
 
(%) 
Little/very little/ 
no influence 
(%) 
No opinion 
 
(%) 
The country  as a 
whole 
2 94 4 
Your city, region  3 93 4 
Your district, 
street 
9 88 4 
Your work 16 74 10 
Your family 81 17 2 
 
− When asked about opportunities to appeal against state mistreatment, Russians would 
prefer to go to the European court of human rights (19%), than to a Russian court (17%).  
A similar number said they would talk to the media or publicise their views on the 
Internet; a  view that contrasts with  their suspicion of EU institutions  
 
- When asked about a range of phrases reflecting the values of democracy, the notion of 
‘private property’ appealed to the 44% of respondents who feel positive about the concept, 
just behind the 49% who feel positive about the ‘protection of human rights’. One third of 
the sample feel neutral towards human rights and almost half are neutral towards liberal 
democracy. Of those who feel negative, most (40%) feel so about capitalism, followed by 
just over a third (36%) who were against privatisation, which can be traced back to the 
Soviet propaganda. Over 80% consider it impossible to earn millions of roubles honestly  
 
- When considering how Russian democracy functions at present, the activities of Duma 
(36.1%) and of Federation Council (37.5%) are viewed as positively influencing life of 
common people.  
 
- A fifth of those interviewed believed that the Duma and local parliament should be fully 
controlled by executive branch of power and a third that it should be partly controlled by 
the executive. Only 22.5% believe that they should be fully independent.   
 
- When comparing these view with what is happening in reality, 5.1% believed local 
parliaments to be fully independent; 11.4% that they are controlled by Russian 
government, 20.6 % that the local administration controls them.  However, 31% believe 
that they are corrupt and anyone with big money is able to get laws adopted. 
 
- This level of scepticism was reflected when 17.1% declared that they would not vote in 
the forthcoming Parliamentary (Duma) elections and 10.7% that they had not yet made up 
to vote and nearly a quarter 22.7%  didn’t know who they are going to vote for.  
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2. THE RUSSIAN STATE 
 
− Most Russians (66%) believe that the state should provide its citizens with a decent 
standard of living’, while a quarter say the ‘state should set rules applicable to everyone, 
and follow them strictly’.  
 
What should relations between the state and its citizens be?  
 
 Jan 2001
i 
(%) 
Mar 2006 
(%) 
The state should interfere with the life and economic 
activity of its citizens as little as possible  6 4 
The state should set rules that apply to everyone and follow 
them strictly 19 25 
The state should care about its citizens by providing them 
with a decent standard of living  71 63 
No opinion  4 8 
 
− The President (58%) and the church (40%) enjoy the most trust. Most Russians 
demonstrate distrust towards other institutions, particularly, courts and law-enforcement 
bodies. Only a quarter of respondents feel protected by the law, while 68% of Russians do 
not.   
 
− When asked which state system is ideal for Russia, a majority (61%) cite one where the 
President coordinated joint work undertaken by the Duma, government, legislature and 
the judicial system, but has overall control. Just 17% believe a separation of executive 
powers from the legislature and the judiciary would be better for the country.  
 
What do you think would be better for Russia? 
 
  
The separation of executive, legislative and judiciary powers 18% 
‘Joint activity by executive, legislative and judiciary powers 
coordinated by the President? 
62% 
No opinion 20% 
 
What do you think Russia needs most: consolidation of power or the accountability of 
power to society?  
 
 2001(%) 1 2006 
(%) 
Consolidation of power  37 43 
Its accountability to society  54 42 
No opinion  9 15 
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3. HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
− When given a range of human rights values, most (68%) cite the right to life, just ahead of 
the two-thirds (64%) who said the right to privacy and home is most important. There was 
a major gap to the next most popular value – the right to choose employment and work 
(36%). Less than a third (29%) cite the right to a fair trial, 22% the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, and one fifth select the right to be punished only under 
the terms of the law. 
 
Which of the following human rights are most important in your opinion?   
 
 (%) 
The right to life  68 
The right to privacy and  home  64 
The right to choose employment and work  36 
The right to own private property (accommodation, land, vehicle, means 
of production) 32 
The right to a fair trial  29 
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion 22 
The right to only be punished under the terms of the law  20 
Freedom of expression  18 
The right to and effective means of legal protection  17 
The right of access to information  12 
The right to move to another country and return  12 
Prohibition of discrimination  10 
The right to get married  9 
Freedom of assembly and association  4 
No opinion  1 
 
− Almost half of Russians feel positively about the term ‘human rights protection’ 
 
− A third of those interviewed 32.3% state that they are worried about serious human rights 
abuses in Russia (only 12.3% think that the current  human rights situation was 
satisfactory) 
 
− Regular two-monthly research undertaken by the Levada Center looks at how Russians 
understand human rights. The views expressed on who should protect and provide for 
Russian citizens seems to indicate that their views were formed long time ago, back in 
Soviet times and have changed little since.  Most frequently, Russians’ understanding of  
‘human rights’ is that they guarantee that the paternal state will look after someone’s life, 
his job and pay for his work, his education, health and  social welfare 
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4. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE & THE RULE OF LAW 
 
− 36.5% of the sample believe that the Russian judiciary is corrupt and anyone with money 
can get a positive decision in a court 
 
− 17.5% believe that it is controlled by local administration, 12% that it is controlled by 
Russian government, while 30.8% gave no answer.  
 
− In thinking about who should control the judiciary, views were evenly split.   26.8%, 
believe wholly by the government executive, 28.9% opt for partly controlled by executive 
branch (administration) and 26.9% want to see it fully independent from executive branch. 
 
− When asked about their view of the rule of law in Russia, respondents identify five key 
human rights in the order of priority: right to life, privacy of life and home, right to own 
property, right to select a job, right to a fair trial. 
 
− 68% of Russians do not feel protected by the law, and a third feel that there are many in 
Russia who think they are above the law. One in three believe that everyone in the country 
is corrupt and many believe that some people are above the law: 59.2% indicate 
government authorities and state officials, 52.2% said people with large amounts money. 
40.8% said- politicians. 40.7% named the siloviki and 16.1% believed that nobody obeys 
the law in Russia. 
 
 
Why don’t you feel protected by the law?  
(This question was put only to those who stated that they do not feel protected by the 
law) 
 
Laws are written not for everyone; there are too many people 
who feel that they are outside the law authorities, security 
agencies, etc.) 
34 
The system is corrupt, I would not receive a fair and impartial 
hearing in court 
31 
Laws are interpreted freely by those who are in power 28 
Laws are changing all the time 17 
Citizens do not have  instruments available to them with which 
to influence the authorities 
15 
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5. RUSSIA AND A MARKET ECONOMY 
 
− While Russians appear to have little understanding or empathy with such notions as 
‘democracy’, ‘freedom’ and ‘liberalism’, the opposite applies when it comes to defining 
what values are best represented by the word ‘order’. Most (44%) said it meant ‘political 
and economic stability’, followed by the 40% who cite ‘strict observance of law by both 
officials and citizens’ and the 38% who said it means the ‘end of theft from the state’.  
 
Is it possible to earn millions honestly in Russia?   
 
Yes 13 
No 83 
No Opinion  4 
 
What is your feeling towards the following phrases?  
 
 Positive 
(%) 
Neutral 
(%) 
Negative 
(%) 
Market economy  29 44 24 
Private property  44 38 14 
Capitalism  10 46 40 
Privatisation  22 38 36 
Protection of human rights  49 33 14 
Liberal democracy  10 49 26 
 
What do you believe best expresses what you think ‘order’ means? 
 
 (%) 
Political and economic stability  44 
Strict observance of laws by both officials and citizens  40 
The end of theft from the state   38 
Social protection of disadvantaged sectors of the population  32 
The end of power struggles leading to the destruction of the country 29 
The possibility of the rights of the individual  28 
Strict discipline 25 
Clean streets and efficient public transport  23 
Security (life) 21 
Involvement of the army, special services, political police in fighting 
crime  
13 
Restriction of democratic rights and freedoms  1 
Slogan that paves the way to democracy  1 
No opinion  3 
 
 
1 Levada Center proprietary research  
2 1997-2003 – All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM)’ survey, 2003-2006 – (VCIOM since acquired by 
Levada Center)   
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What is a ‘normal life’ to a Russian? 
 
People differ in what is meant by talking about a ‘normal society’. How important do you 
think each of the following is for a normal society? 
  
% saying essential 
a. People can go about their everyday lives without government interfering 
72 
b. Everybody who wants to work can find a job 
82 
c. Government officials treat ordinary people fairly 
74 
d. If things go wrong, public welfare services will help 
72 
e. If you save money, it does not lose its value because of inflation 
83 
f. It is safe to go about the streets without being afraid of crime 
85 
g. There are opportunities for you or your children to improve your living conditions 
85 
 
 
 
Do you think Russian life today is that of a normal society? 
 
Definitely 
10 
Fairly normal 
17 
Only a little 
45 
Not at all normal 
27 
 
 
 
 
If not definitely normal: How long do you think it will be before Russia becomes a 
normal society? 
1-2 years 
2 
3-5 years 
14 
6-10 years 
41 
Never 
15 
Difficult to know if it ever will be normal 
29 
 
27 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
Source: New Russia Barometer XIII, Fieldwork 18-23 March 2004, N=1602 
 
 
 
